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The Fractional Mineral Deed
"Subject To" a Lease
FRANK W. ELLIOTT, JR.*
The recent case of Garrett v. Dils Co.' points out again the difficulty in
construing mineral deeds made subject to an existing lease. The elements
of the deed essential to this discussion were as follows:
"[Grantor does] . . .grant, sell, convey, assign, and deliver unto ...
Grantee an undivided one sixty-fourth interest in and to all of the oil,
gas and other minerals in and under, and that may be produced from the
following described land: ...
"Said land being now under an oil and gas lease. . ., it is understood
and agreed that this sale is made subject to the terms of said lease, but
covers and includes one-eighth of all of the oil royalty, and gas rental or
royalty due and to be paid under the terms of said lease.
"It is understood and agreed that one-eighth of the money rentals...
is to be paid to... Grantee and in event that the above described lease
for any reason becomes cancelled or forfeited, then and in that event
an undivided one-eighth of the lease interest and all future rentals on
said land for oil, gas and other mineral privileges shall be owned by said
Grantee, he owning one-eighth of one-eighth of all oil, gas and other min-
erals in and under said lands, together with one-eighth interest in all
future rents."
The lease mentioned in the deed expired and a second lease was made,
both leases reserving a 1/8th royalty. The heirs of the grantor of the
deed sued the successor of the grantee in trespass to try title to ascertain
the proportion of royalty that should be paid to each under the second
lease. The deed was conceded by all parties to be unambiguous and its
construction was the sole problem in the case. The majority of the court,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Hickman, approached the solution by first
deciding the royalty to which the grantee would have been entitled under
the original lease, and then determining from the deed whether the roy-
alty should be the same under subsequent leases. The court reasoned that
had only the granting clause appeared, clearly a 1/64th interest in the
minerals in place would be conveyed. However, the royalty transfer
clause covered 1/8th of the royalty under the lease, so the court decided
that the parties intended to convey a royalty of 1/64th of production, or
1/8th of the 1/8th royalty retained in the lease. Then turning to the
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lease termination clause, the court could discover no intent to grant a les-
ser interest under a subsequent lease. Stating that the parties construed the
grant of 1/64th of the minerals as a grant of 1/8th of the royalty,2 it was
held that under the subsequent lease the grantee had a right to 1/8th of
the royalty, 1/8th of the delay rentals, and 1/8th of the bonus. Since this
was so, the grantee had all the rights incident to ownership of 1/8th of the
minerals and the conclusion followed that the deed conveyed an undi-
vided 1/8th of the mineral fee.
Four justices dissented, stating that by the terms of the deed a 1/64th
mineral interest was conveyed, together with 1/8th of the royalty and
rents under the existing lease, and 1/8th of the bonus and rents, but only
1/64th of the royalty under subsequent leases.
I. THE TYPICAL MINERAL DEED AND ROYALTY TRANSFER
In a typical deed conveying a mineral interest subject to an existing
lease there are three general sections, containing four blanks for the in-
sertion of the fraction to be conveyed. The first section, or granting
clause, is designed as a conveyance of all or part of the minerals. The
second, or royalty transfer clause, is designed to set out the present estates
or property interests arising out of the lease which are intended to be
conveyed. The third, or lease termination clause, states the interests
owned by the grantee, if for some reason the existing lease terminates.
The blanks mentioned are for the mineral interest, the royalty under
the lease, the rent under the lease and the grantee's interest on expiration
of the lease.
The second section is actually unnecessary in most cases, since the
royalty and rents under the lease would be transferred in the same pro-
portion by the granting clause.8 If a different interest is intended to be
conveyed, it of course would be needed.
The third section is also unnecessary, but may be useful in resolving
any doubts about the meaning of the other clauses.4
H. SOURCES OF CONFUSION
A good deal of confusion can result if different fractions are placed in
the various blanks. Moreover, the addition of further clauses, mistakes
about the size of the tract of land involved, and poor wording of the
clauses add to the chaos.
2 Id. at 906.
3 Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945), 25 TEXAs L. Rnv. 1, 26
(1946); Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943), 25 TEXAs L. Rv. 1, 24
(1946).
'See, e.g., Schubert v. Miller, 119 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), 17 TEXAs L.
RMv. 346, 350 (1939).
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A. Misunderstanding of the Nature of the Property Interest
of a Landowner after the Execution of a Lease
The greatest source of confusion is the failure to understand the exact
nature of the property interest of a landowner after the execution of an
oil and gas lease. The lessor often thinks of his ownership as a 1/8th
royalty interest rather than a possibility of reverter in all the minerals.
This failure of understanding is illustrated by Colonial Royalties Co. v.
Keener.5 In that case the deed provided that all the minerals were con-
veyed subject to a lease, but that all the royalty under the lease was
included. Furthermore, if the lease expired, the minerals were to be
jointly owned: a 7/8th working interest by the grantor, and a 1/8th
royalty interest by the grantee. The court held, by construing the whole
deed, that a 1/8th non-participating royalty had been conveyed. The
court said that in the "popular sense"8 1/8th royalty was often thought
of as all the landowner has in such a situation7
1. CONFLICTING FFLACTIONS iNT GRANTING AND ROYALTY TRANSFER
CLAUSES.
If different fractions appear in the granting and royalty transfer
clauses and no lease termination clause is used in the deed, the courts
have construed the deeds in several ways. In Paxton v. Benedum-Trees
Oil Co.8 the deed conveyed 1/16th of the oil and 1/2 of the gas, including
1/2 of all the royalties, incomes and rentals that might arise by virtue of
any lease. The court held that this was a grant of 1/2 of the mineral fee,
applying the rule that an ambiguous grant should be construed most
strongly against the grantor. 9
The majority of courts have given effect to both clauses. The deed
involved in Hinkle v. Gauntt0 reserved 1/16th of the minerals and a 1/2
interest in bonuses or rent from the lease presently on the land. It was
held that the deed Would be construed literally and the fact that the
reservation of rentals was 1/2 does not mean that the same interest in
the mineral fee was reserved.
In Gillespie v. Blanton1 ' the grant was of 1/8th of the minerals sub-
ject to a lease, including the whole royalty under the lease. The effect of
this deed was to give the grantee a 1/8th mineral fee plus the whole
5 266 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1953).
6 Colonial Royalties Co. v. Keener at 472.
See also Swearingen v. Oldhan, 195 Olda. 532, 159 P.2d 247 (1945); Manley v.
Boling, 186 Okla. 59, 96 P.24 30 (1939); Berk v. Beckett, 200 Ark. 1189, 137 S.W.2d
898 (1940); Craft v. Hahn, 246 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952, error ref'd n.r.e.).
8 80 W. Va. 187, 94 S.E. 472 (1917), 10 TEXAS L. REv. 1, 11 (1931).
9 See also Barnard v. Jamison, 78 Cal. App. 2d 736, 177 P.2d 341 (1947).
10. 201 Okla. 432,206 P.2d 1001 (1949).
21214 Ky. 49,282 S.W. 1061 (1926).
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royalty while the original lease was in effect. However, under any subse-
quent lease he would only receive 1/8th of the royalty provided. 2
An odd result of giving effect to both clauses is found in Paddock v.
Vasquez,5 where 3 per cent of 100 per cent of the minerals were granted,
subject to a lease, including in the grant, but not limited to, 6/26ths of the
bonus, rent and royalty under the present or any other lease. Expressly
stating that the deed was unambiguous, the court held that the grantee
owned only a 3 per cent mineral fee but was entitled to 6/25ths of all
bonuses, rents, and royalties. In effect, although owning only 3 per cent
of the minerals, the grantee had all of the benefits of 24 per cent.
If the deed contains a lease termination clause, the courts have usually
construed it as controlling any contradiction between the granting and
royalty transfer clauses. In Krutzfeld v. Stevenson14 a grant of 5 % of the
minerals was made, subject to a lease, and included 2/Sths of the royalty
under the lease. Upon termination the grantor was to own 3/6ths and
the grantee 2/5ths of the minerals. The court reasoned that since the
land was under an existing lease, the parties believed that the grantor
could not presently convey a fraction of the whole mineral interest. He
had, therefore, attempted to accomplish his purpose by conveying 2/5ths
of 12V per cent, which was the royalty under the lease. Effect was given
to this intention, although the court stated that a grant of 2/6ths of the
minerals was the proper terminology for such a conveyance.' 5
Two different results have been reached when, although the fractions
in the granting and the lease termination clause agreed, they were in
conffict with the royalty transfer clause. In Schubert v. Miller6 the deed
granted 1/32nd of the minerals subject to a lease, including 1/4th of the
royalty under the lease, and a 1/32nd mineral interest to the grantee
upon expiration of the lease. The court held that from the face of the
instrument the grantee owned a 1/32nd mineral fee and was entitled to
receive 1/4th of the royalties under the original lease, but if it expired, he
would receive only 1/32nd of the royalty under any subsequent lease.
However, in Tipps v. BodineT 7 somewhat tortuous reasoning led to a
different conclusion. The grant was of 1/16th of the minerals, subject to
a lease, including 1/2 of the rents and royalties under the lease. On ter-
mination, 1/2 of the lease interest and rents was to be owned by the
grantee. The original lease expired and a new one was made. The trial
'
2 See also Rowland v. Griffin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S.W.2d 457 (1929).
13 122 Cal. App. 2d 396, 265 P.2d 121 (1953), 32 TExAs L. REv. 766 (1954).
.4 86 Mont. 453, 284 Pac. 553 (1930), 10 T=XAs L. Rav. 1, 14 (1931).
'1 See also Broderick v. Stevenson Consol. Oil Co., 88 Mont. 34, 290 Pac. 244 (1930),
10 TE As L. Blnv. 1, 14 (1931); Loeffler v. King, 228 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.
1950), reversed on other grounds, 149 Tex. 626, 236 S.W.2d 772 (1951).
16 119 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938), 17 TExAs L. Rnv. 346, 350 (1939).
1r 101 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex Civ. App. 1936, error ref'd).
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court reformed the deed, placing 1/2 wherever 1/16th appeared. On ap-
peal the court did not allow reformation but reached the same result,
reasoning that the grantor had conveyed 1/2 of the minerals then
owned by him (i.e., 1/2 of 1/8th) or 1/16th, and 1/2 of his possibility of
reverter. Since the original lease had expired, the grantee owned a full
1/2. It appears that reformation was the proper approach under the
facts of the case, and such a devious method was unnecessary to reach
the desired result. As can be seen, the facts of this case are similar to
those of Garrett v. Dils Co., in which the Texas Supreme Court used still
another approach.
2. SAmE FRACTIONS iN GRANTING AND ROYALTY TRANSFR CLAUSES
When the fractions are the same in both the granting and royalty
transfer clauses, and no lease termination clause is present, the courts
have given effect to the terms of the deed as written. In Humphrey v.
Stidham,"' a suit for reformation, the deed granted 1/128th of the min-
erals, subject to a lease, including 1/128th of the royalty. The claim was
made that the intention of the parties was to grant 1/16th of the minerals
and that by mistake 1/16th of 1/8th or 1/128th was inserted in the deed.
The court denied reformation, stating that the grant was obviously of a
1/128th mineral fee.19
Shinn v. Buxton 20 involved a grant of 1/128th of the minerals, subject
to a lease, including 1/16th of the full 1/8th of all the royalty. It was
held to be a conveyance of 1/128th of the minerals and 1/128th of the
royalty, or a royalty of 1/1024th. Much weight was placed on the word
"of" following the fraction 1/8th, the court stating that the deed was
clear and unambiguous.
When a lease termination clause is included which conflicts with the
fractions stated in the granting and royalty transfer clauses, the lease
termination clause is generally held to control. Citizens Inv. Co. v.
Armer21 involved a grant of 1/16th of the minerals, subject to a lease,
including 1/16th of all the rent and royalty under the lease. On termina-
tion the grantee was to own 1/2 of the minerals. Construing the instru-
ment as a whole, the court held that the grantee owned a full 1/2
mineral fee.
22
If the lease termination clause does not conflict, the job of the courts is
simplified. In Richardson v. Hart23 the deed conveyed 1/16th of 1/8th of
18 124 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
19 See also McNeill v. Shaw, 295 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1956).
20 154 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1946).
21 179 Ark. 376, 16 S.W.2d 15 (1929), 10 TEXAS L. Rxv. 1, 28 (1931).
22 See also Smith v. Grubb, 402 Ill. 451, 84 N.E.2d 421 (1949); Stanley v. Slone,
216 Ky. 114, 287 S.W. 360 (1926), 10 TmcAs L. Lv. 1, 27 (1931).
23 143 Tex. 392, 185 S.W.2d 563 (1945), 25 TExAs L. 1mv. 1, 26 (1946).
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the minerals, subject to a lease, including 1/16th of 1/8th of the royalty.
No rentals were included, and on termination, none of the lease interest
or future rentals were to be owned by the grantee, he owning 1/16th of
1/8th of the minerals, with no interest in future rents. The court held
that the deed was free from ambiguity and conveyed two separate es-
tates in the land. The first was a permanent interest in the minerals in
place (1/16th of 1/8th or 1/128th) and the second was an interest in the
royalty payable under the lease (1/16th of 1/8th of the 1/8th royalty
or 1/1064th of production). The fact that the grantee was to have no in-
terest in present or future rents or in future "lease interest" made no ap-
parent difference, since the grantee was to own a continuing 1/128th
interest in the minerals in place. It is likely that had the lease expired
and a new one been executed, the grantee would have received 1/128th
of the royalty reserved in the new lease.24
It will be observed that the same form of deed was used in the Richard-
son case as was used in Garrett v. Dils Co. It could be argued that the rea-
soning in the former case should have been applied to the latter, rendering
the deed a conveyance of 1/64th of the minerals, 1/8th of the royalty
and rents under the existing lease, 1/8th of the bonus and rents under
any subsequent lease, and 1/64th of the royalty under future leases. The
fact that in Richardson the grantee did not own any right to future "lease
interest" or future rents did not deprive him of the 1/128ths mineral inter-
est. Likewise, perhaps the fact that the grantee in Garrett had a right to
1/8th of future "lease interest" and rentals should not act to give him a
larger interest in the mineral fee than the 1/64th granted. It has been
shown 25 that many times the courts have given effect to different frac-
tional interests in the mineral fee and royalty, and the fact that the last
clause quoted in Garrett states that the grantee owns 1/8th of 1/8th
(1/64th) of the minerals seems to make the case even stronger for such
an interpretation. 2 6
This approach would tend to give a uniformity and predictability of
24 See also Jones v. Bedford, 56 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932, error refd). Shep-
ard v. Hagan, 291 Mich. 436, 289 N.W. 205 (1939) is an interesting case in which
the fraction 1/16th appeared in the granting clause, royalty transfer clause and lease
termination clause. The trial court granted reformation, substituting 1/2 for 1/16th.
The appellate court held that the deed was ambiguous, reinforcing its logic with the
language in a subsequent lease which stated that the grantor had conveyed 1/16th of
the minerals. The court's reasoning is lost on this writer.
251owland v. Griffin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S.W.2d 457 (1929); Paddock v. Vasquez,
122 Cal. App. 2d 396, 265 P.2d 121 (1953), 32 TExAs L. Rnv. 766 (1954); Gillispie v.
Blanton, 214 Ky. 49, 282 S.W. 1061 (1926); Hinkle v. Gauntt, 201 Okla. 432, 206
P.2d 1001 (1949); Woods v. Sims, 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954); Hoffman v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925), 4 TEYXAs L. lBv. 334
(1925); Schubert v. Miller, 119 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).




construction lacking in other approaches. However, as fine an end as this
may be for the enlightenment of future scriveners, it remains that such
an approach may vary the intent of the parties in older instrunents. The
deed construed in Richardson contained no discrepancy in the fractional
amounts stated, while such a discrepancy did appear in Garrett. The
many fractions, including the weak buttress of 1/8 of 1/8 for 1/64, lead
one to the conclusion that the actual intent was effectuated in the Garrett
case. However, it seems that the theory behind this effectuation could
better have been a decision that ambiguity existed, and a reflection of
the actual intent by a resolving of the ambiguity.
B. Mistake Concerning Amount of Land Involved
A second cause of confusion is the later discovery that the amount of
land described in the deed is not the actual amount on the ground. In
Olvey v. Jones27 the deed conveyed 1/2 of the minerals, subject to a lease,
including 1/2 of the royalty under the lease. If the lease terminated, each
party would own 1/2 of the minerals. The deed stated that fifty-five acres
were being conveyed, but actually described 83.23 acres. The plaintiff
grantor claimed that only 55 acres were intended to be conveyed. The
purchase price had been $2750, or $100 per acre for 27.5 acres, being the
half of 55. The deed was held unambiguous, conveying a full 1/2 interest
in the entire 83.23 acres, not just 27.5/83.23.28
In Woods v. Sims29 the grant was of 25/200ths of the minerals on a
supposed 200 acre tract, with a clause stating that the intention was to
convey a 25 acre mineral interest, subject to a lease, including 25/200ths
of the royalty, and on termination the grantee would own 26/200ths of
the minerals. It developed that actually 226.88 acres were in the tract.
The court of civil appeals held that 25/226.88ths of the mineral fee was
conveyed, and all parties acquiesced in this decision. However, the
supreme court held that 25/200ths of the royalty under the existing lease
was transferred. The court reasoned that the intent clause applied only
to the conveyance of a permanent interest in the minerals, containing no
reference to the royalty, and therefore two different fractional interests
were granted. Since there were two conveyances, the royalty interest
could be larger or smaller than the permanent mineral interest, and
27 95 S.W.2d 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936, error dism'd).
28 In the first trial of the case, reformation was asked for only the granting clause.
The court held that even were the granting clause reformed, the principle of Hoffman
v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 273 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925), discussed infra,
would apply and the royalty would still be one-half of the whole. In a later trial and
appeal of the same case, 137 Tex. 639, 156 S.W.2d 977 (1941), reformation of both the
granting clause and the royalty transfer clause was sought and granted.
29 154 Tex. 59, 273 S.W.2d 617 (1954).
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whether such is the intent of the parties must be determined from the
language of the deed.
C. Poor Wording of the Various Clauses
A further source of confusion is lack of care in the use of language in
the royalty transfer clause. At times this might result from a failure to
adapt a form to a situation it was not designed to cover. For example, in
Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.30 the grant was of 1/2 the minerals
on 90 acres out of a 320 acre tract, subject to a lease on the entire 320
acres, including 1/2 of the royalty under the lease. Upon termination of
the lease each of the parties to the deed would own 1/2 of the minerals.
Construing the deed as granting two separate interests, the court held
that the royalty granted was from the entire 320 acres, and that even
though it was possible that a mistake had been made in the deed, the
wording was clear and could not be changed in the present litigation.3 1
The difficulty in the Hoffman case was likely due to the fact that the
form used was appropriate for a conveyance of an interest in the entire
leased premises, but needed some modification to adapt it to a conveyance
of only a specific part.
Failure to adapt a form primarily designed for conveyances by some-
one owning a full fee to one covering a conveyance by a grantor owning
only a fractional interest may also raise problems. In Waters v. Edwardss2
the grantor owned 1/4th of the minerals and conveyed that 1/4th of the
minerals, subject to a lease, including "such undivided 1/4th part of
royalty due me under the lease." The contention was that only 1/4th of
the 1/4th of the royalty was conveyed. The court held that the entire
1/4th of the minerals and 1/4th of the royalty was conveyed, stating that
the deed was clear, but could possibly have been better expressed as "such
1/4th part of the royalty, same being the part due me."' 1
III. CONCLUSION
The decisions discussed above lead to the conclusion that when a frac-
tional undivided interest in the minerals of a tract is to be conveyed, the
same fraction should normally be inserted in each of the blanks provided
for such fraction. 4 Frequently a form is used for a mineral deed and
302 73 S.W. 828 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925).
31 See the thorough discussions of the Hoffman case in Williams, Hoffman v. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co.: The "Subject-To" Clause in Mineral and Royalty Deeds, 30
TExAs L. LEv. 395 (1952); Stayton, An Easement to Decision: A Servitude upon
Judicial Legislation, 35 T-ExAs L. REv. 20, 42-46, 50 (1956); Meyers & Williams,
Hoffman v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.: A Further Comment, 35 TExAs L. REv. 362
(1957).
32 196 Ark. 1088, 121 S.W.2d 79 (1938).
"3 See also Wilson v. Steam, 202 Ark. 1197, 149 S.W.2d 571 (1941).
'4 See, e.g., Smiley v. Thomas, 220 Ark. 116, 246 S.W.2d 419 (1952); Segars v.
1958]
TEXAS LAW REVIEW
royalty transfer in which only one blank is provided for a fraction, in the
granting clause. It is then provided in the succeeding clauses that the
same undivided interest in the rents and royalties under the lease is also
conveyed.3 5 Of course, if it is desired to convey a different interest in the
royalties under the existing lease than the permanent mineral interest,
the latter type of form can not be used, and the fractions must be inserted
so as to accomplish the desired result. And, as mentioned earlier, forms
must also be adapted to any special purposes of the intended grant.
When further cases reach the courts, a uniform procedure should be
followed. The deeds should be construed to effectuate the intent of the
parties, but if unambiguous, that intent should be found from the words
of the instrument itself. When different fractions appear, but the granting
clause is clear and buttressed by the lease termination clause, effect
should be given to the two different grants, and the deed construed as
written.36 If the actual intent of the parties be different, a suit for refor-
mation will often be available. Even if such a suit is not available, because
of limitations, laches, or some other reason, the court should still not
attempt to construe the deed as the court would have intended, but rather
as the parties apparently intended by the written words of the deed.
Goodwin, 196 Ark. 221, 117 S.W.2d 43 (1938); Richards v. Shearer, 145 Kan. 88, 64
P.2d 56 (1937); Koenig v. Calcote, 199 Miss. 435, 25 So.2d 763 (1946); Patek v. Dun-
can, 178 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944, error ref'd); Clemmens v. Kennedy, 68
S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934, error refd).
3 See, e.g., Ford v. Jones, 85 So.2d 215 (Miss. 1956); Gulf Refining Co. v. Harrison,
201 Miss. 294,30 So.2d 44 (1947).
36 See dissenting opinion in Garrett v. Dils Co., 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Tex. Sup. Ct.
1957). But see text discussion at close of Section IIA2., supra.
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